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Is Corporate Governance 
Different for Bank Holding 
Companies?
1. Introduction
n the wake of the recent corporate scandals, corporate
governance practices have received heightened attention. 
Shareholders, creditors, regulators, and academics are 
examining the decision-making process in corporations and 
other organizations and are proposing changes in governance 
structures to enhance accountability and efficiency. To the 
extent that these proposals are based on academic research, 
they generally draw upon a large body of studies on the 
governance of firms in unregulated, nonfinancial industries. 
Financial institutions, however, are very different from 
firms in unregulated industries, such as manufacturing firms. 
Thus, the question arises as to whether these proposals and 
reforms can also be effective at enhancing the governance of 
financial institutions, and, in particular, banking firms. The 
question is a difficult one to answer, though, given the little 
research on the governance of banking firms. Therefore, in 
order to evaluate reforms to the governance structures of 
banking firms, it is important to understand current 
governance practices as well as how governance differs between 
banking and unregulated firms. Otherwise, governance 
proposals cannot be fine-tuned. Significantly, uniformly 
designed proposals that do not take into account industry 
differences at the very least may be ineffective in improving the 
governance of financial institutions, and at worst may have 
unintended negative consequences.
Accordingly, this article examines corporate governance in 
banking firms. In particular, we study corporate governance 
variables identified as relevant by academics and practitioners 
and describe their differences and similarities vis-á-vis banking 
firms and manufacturing firms. Because public information on 
governance characteristics is generally available only for 
publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs), we examine 
the governance of BHCs and not banks. We also discuss the 
effect of regulation—such as supervisory and regulatory 
requirements at the state and Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) levels—prior to 2000 on banking firm 
behavior. Many typical external governance mechanisms, such 
as the threat of hostile takeovers in the industry, are absent in 
the case of banking firms; therefore, we focus primarily on 
internal governance structures and shareholder block 
ownership. Our goal is to provide useful information and a 
road map for thinking about the governance of financial 
institutions, in terms of reform as well as research. 
We discuss the potential benefits and costs associated with 
some of the corporate governance variables for an average firm. 
However, we stress that all of these variables are ultimately part 
of a simultaneous system that determines the corporation’s 
value and the allocation of such value among claimants. Also, 
different governance mechanisms may be substitutes for one 
another. For example, certain executive pay packages can vary 
across firms, even in the same business environment, for good 
reason. Firms with more effective boards may have more 
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equity-based CEO compensation in their structure, while 
firms with greater CEO ownership may have more cash 
compensation (Mehran 1995). Thus, the quality of 
governance of any organization must be evaluated along a 
number of dimensions. 
Our sample consists of thirty-five bank holding companies 
over the 1986-96 period. For these BHCs, we construct 
governance variables or proxies that have received attention by 
researchers in law, economics, organization, and management 
who argue that the variables are correlated with governance 
practices. We also compare variables in our sample with those 
for manufacturing firms compiled in other studies.
Our comparison of BHCs and manufacturing firms yields 
several key findings. First, BHC board size (18.2 members 
versus 12.1 members) and the percentage of outside directors 
(68.7 percent versus 60.6 percent) are significantly larger on 
average. Second, BHC boards on average have more 
committees (4.9 compared with 4.4) and meet slightly more 
frequently (7.9 times versus 7.6 times). Third, measured in 
percentage terms, the ratio of chief executives’ stock option pay 
to salary plus bonuses is smaller at BHCs (1.0 as opposed to 
1.6). Fourth, the percentage of CEO direct equity holdings is 
smaller for BHC chief executives (2.3 percent compared with 
2.9 percent) as is the value of their direct equity holdings 
($27.9 million versus $133.8 million). Finally, fewer institu-
tions on average hold a share of BHCs in our sample (204 as 
opposed to 535) and institutions hold a smaller percentage 
of a BHC’s equity (42.2 percent compared with 
54.6 percent). The findings on board size, percentage of 
outside directors, ownership (percentage and market value), 
and the ratio of stock options to salary plus bonuses 
complement those of other studies, which use samples that 
differ from ours (see Houston and James [1995] and Booth, 
Cornett, and Tehranian [2002]).
Our findings of systematic differences between the 
governance of banking and manufacturing firms bolster the 
argument that governance structures may indeed be industry-
specific. We argue that these differences are influenced by 
differences in the investment characteristics of the two types of 
firms as well as by the presence of regulation. Moreover, the 
differences reported here are similar to those found between 
manufacturing firms and insurance industry firms (see, for 
example, Talmor and Wallace [2001]) and between 
manufacturing firms and public utilities firms (see, for 
example, Booth, Cornett, and Tehranian [2002]).1 These 
results suggest that governance reforms, in order to be effective, 
could take industry differences into account. 
2. Why Governance May Differ 
for Bank Holding Companies
Shleifer and Vishny define corporate governance as dealing 
“with the ways that suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment” (1997, 
p. 737). According to agency theory, if managers operate 
independently, they may make financing, investment, and 
payout decisions that are detrimental to shareholders.2 To 
mitigate the conflict between managers and shareholders, the 
literature offers several solutions, such as monitoring by the 
board of directors and blockholders, compensation contracts, 
and managerial equity investment.3
The governance of banking firms may be different from that 
of unregulated, nonfinancial firms for several reasons. For one, 
the number of parties with a stake in an institution’s activity 
complicates the governance of financial institutions. In 
addition to investors, depositors and regulators have a direct 
interest in bank performance. On a more aggregate level, 
regulators are concerned with the effect governance has on the 
performance of financial institutions because the health of the 
overall economy depends upon their performance.
As a result, the board of directors of a banking firm is placed 
in a crucial role in its governance structure. Although the 
boards of BHCs are assigned the same legal responsibilities as 
other boards,4 regulators have placed additional expectations 
on bank, as opposed to BHC, boards that delineate their 
responsibilities even further.5 These usually take the form of 
laws, regulations, or guidance, and they generally reflect 
interest in safe and sound financial institutions.6 To the extent 
that BHC boards are influenced by the structure and operation 
of their subsidiary bank boards, these expectations may also 
affect how BHC boards operate (see, for example, Adams and 
Mehran [2002]). 
These and other differences in the operation of financial and 
nonfinancial institutions have led many to view regulatory 
oversight of the industry as a substitute for corporate 
governance, or at least to view governance as less critical to the 
conduct and operation of banking firms.7 Others argue that 
effective supervision could lead to board oversight becoming a 
more critical element of banking firm governance—that is, 
these could be complementary forces. Either way, the presence 
of regulation should affect the design of internal governance 
mechanisms.8 
One major area likely to be affected by regulation is the 
structure of executive compensation. Stock-based compensation 
motivates top management to undertake more value-
enhancing decisions (see Core, Guay, and Larcker [2003]), but 
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risk-taking. Thus, although in nonfinancial firms stock options 
may be appropriate instruments to provide incentives for 
managers to create value, as well as to protect the creditors of 
distressed companies, the options may conflict with policy 
objectives that seek to protect the nonshareholding 
stakeholders, such as depositors and taxpayers in financial 
firms. As regulatory reform has expanded the range of activities 
available to financial firms, it has become increasingly 
important for policymakers to understand the relationship 
between governance structure and the incentive for risk-
taking.9
Resolution of a financially distressed condition or outright 
insolvency in the banking industry can also have an important 
effect on top managers’ incentive structures. In an unregulated 
environment, financial distress generally leads to reorgani-
zation and, in most cases, the incumbent top manager is given 
the opportunity to turn the corporation around.10 Moreover, 
CEOs of distressed firms typically get paid according to their 
compensation contracts, even when their firms enter 
bankruptcy.
However, in the banking industry, distress usually leads to 
liquidation, and the incumbent is removed from management 
(see Skeel [1998] for a discussion of how and when regulators 
act in insolvency cases). In addition, depositors’ claims have 
seniority over management compensation contracts. Since 
stock options are long-term compensation contracts, all else 
equal, rational chief executives of BHCs can be expected to 
demand more cash compensation relative to equity-based 
compensation, as the latter becomes worthless in the event of 
liquidation (Mehran and Winton 2001).11
Large grants to top executives (and employees) have the 
potential to impact banking firms’ capital by way of future 
share repurchases. When executives (and employees) exercise 
their options, the firm typically has to repurchase shares from 
the market. Thus, capital leaves the firm. By granting options, 
the firm loses its flexibility with regard to when and how much 
to pay out. Therefore, large grants of options in any given year 
have the potential to affect the capital base adversely in later 
years when options become vested and are exercised. This can 
attract the scrutiny of regulators.
Three other factors can affect the executive compensation 
structure in the banking industry, independent of regulation. 
First, Smith and Watts (1992) argue that a firm’s 
compensation structure is influenced by the firm’s 
investment opportunity set. They contend that because it is 
easier for the board to observe, monitor, and evaluate the 
actions of CEOs of low-growth firms or industries, the board 
relies more on fixed compensation than on stock-based 
compensation. Characteristics of the investment opportunity 
set of firms in the banking industry are most likely different 
than those for firms in unregulated environments (see 
Houston and James [1995]). Therefore, the compensation 
policy of banking firms is most likely different. We discuss 
this issue more fully later on.
Second, competition in the managerial labor market and the 
product market may also affect governance, as Fama (1980), 
Jensen (1993), and Hart (1983) suggest. The banking industry 
is, arguably, competitive in both markets. Also, interstate 
banking deregulation most likely has resulted in more 
competition.12 Thus, the similarity in the production 
technology of banking firms as well as industry competition 
can impact the governance of banking firms. Specifically, 
according to contracting theory, contracts are easier to 
construct and are more likely to exist in industries where more 
precise (relative) performance measures are available and 
where it is not relatively costly to replace a CEO (Parrino 1997). 
In general, performance measures are better able to filter the 
effects of industry and marketwide shocks in homogenous 
industries. Thus, relative performance is easier to measure and 
poorly performing CEOs are easier to identify in such 
industries. In addition, the costs of replacing CEOs are lower in 
such industries because firm-specific human capital is lower. 
Accordingly, stock-based compensation contracts will tend to 
be less important in homogenous industries such as banking, 
where relative performance measures are more precise. 
Moreover, monitors are likely to expend less effort and fewer 
resources in homogeneous industries (Parrino 1997, p. 195).13
Third, capital structure may influence executive 
compensation in BHCs. According to agency theory, 
stockholders want the board to compensate a CEO with stock 
options because they increase the CEO’s pay-performance 
sensitivity. A higher level of stock options, in theory, motivates 
the CEO to pursue riskier investment strategies. If the firm has 
debt in its capital structure, riskier strategies benefit stock-
holders at the expense of debtholders (see, for example, Jensen 
and Meckling [1976]). In efficient capital markets, however, 
the incentive for risk-taking is anticipated by debtholders, and 
thus increased reliance on stock options gives rise to a debt 
premium, or cost of debt (John and John 1993). The size of the 
premium is related to the leverage ratio. To reduce the cost of 
debt, leveraged firms may choose to scale back their use of stock 
options. Because BHCs are highly leveraged institutions, they 
may therefore want to limit their use of stock options as it 
could, for example, affect their cost of issuing debt. John and 
Qian (2003) support this argument, and find that the lower the 
pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs of BHCs is, the higher 
the ratio of the BHCs’ debt to total assets is.14 As a result of 
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unregulated firms as well as the presence of regulation, we 
expect BHCs to have less stock-based compensation in their 
executive compensation packages.
The presence of regulation and the high leverage of banking 
firms may also affect the ability of external governance 
mechanisms to resolve the governance problems of these firms. 
For example, the absence of an active market for corporate 
control in the banking industry prevents better performing 
firms from taking over the poorly performing ones and 
removing their boards.
Note that despite active consolidation in the banking 
industry, there have been very few hostile takeover bids. There 
are at least four reasons for this phenomenon. First, state laws 
and banking regulations impose substantial delays on any 
hostile bid. Delay is a significant impediment to any hostile 
offer—it allows the target firm to arrange defenses or seek 
alternative bidders—but it is particularly important in a 
regulated environment. Delay also has an impact on a bid’s 
progress in the equity markets, as arbitrageurs rarely involve 
themselves in mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry 
because the time required for a transaction to take place 
reduces the value of any spread between market and 
transaction prices. Also, since the gestation period for 
acquisitions in banking is much longer than it is for firms in an 
unregulated environment, bidding banks are less likely to 
receive tenders of large blocks from sophisticated investors 
until the regulatory approval process is completed. This creates 
uncertainty about the offer’s potential for completion. 
Second, many stakeholder groups—that is, competitors and 
consumer advocates—can use the delay to organize opposition 
to a regulated acquisition and influence the decision of the 
regulatory body (see McGlaughlin and Mehran [1995] for a 
similar discussion of hostile offers in the utilities industry). 
Third, the medium of exchange in hostile offers is typically all 
cash or mostly cash (see, for example, Franks, Harris, and 
Mayer [1988]; Fishman [1989] argues that cash preempts other 
bidders). The acquirer typically borrows the funds needed for 
the acquisition investment and relies on its investment bankers 
to raise the funds (Safieddene and Titman 1999), particularly 
when the target is large. BHCs, however, are unwilling to 
borrow funds for acquisition purposes as they are already 
highly leveraged.15 Fourth, many banks in the holding 
companies or subsidiaries of holding companies hold a 
significant share of their ultimate parent company as pension 
trustee or as fund manager. This large block ownership reduces 
the probability of success in a hostile offer.
Constraints on hostile acquisitions in the banking industry 
can potentially increase the size of boards. In a successful 
hostile takeover, the board of an acquirer becomes the board of 
the two combining entities around the time of merger 
completion. Thus, while the asset size of the firm increases, 
board size may actually stay the same. In the banking industry, 
however, hostile offers are rare, and so, with a typical 
acquisition in the industry, most members of a target 
company’s board do not leave the board of the consolidated 
entity until their term expires. As a result, acquisitions not only 
increase the asset size of the acquirer, they may increase board 
size, at least in the years around the merger completion. 
Therefore, we expect BHCs to have boards that are larger than 
boards in unregulated firms.
Finally, regulation may also reduce blockholders’ incentives 
to monitor the boards of financial institutions. In general, in an 
environment where regulators are active, blockholders are 
passive. In an unregulated environment, blockholders typically 
invest in the shares of undervalued companies. They then gain 
a seat (or seats) on the board through proxy contests and exert 
pressure on management to restructure corporate assets and/or 
change corporate payout policy. In addition, blockholders 
often sue the board, and tarnish outside directors’ reputations 
in order to achieve their objectives. Blockholders are also more 
willing to invest capital in a share of the company, as well as 
other resources, if they can get a fair assessment of the value of 
the company and face little or no opposition on (quick) asset 
restructuring. Conversely, a regulatory environment, at times, 
may interfere with the information production and acquisition 
process, as disclosure of some information may be perceived by 
regulators as potentially causing bank runs.16 Blockholders are 
also more unlikely to gain seats through proxy fights and 
acquire additional information about a regulated firm. 
Moreover, even if blockholders can influence management to 
restructure its assets, the restructuring may take some time in 
the banking industry. Thus, it is likely that blockholders’ 
incentives are affected by regulation, implying that block 
ownership of firms in the banking industry should be less 
concentrated than it is in unregulated environments.
3. Sample Construction 
and Characteristics
Our banking sample consists of thirty-five publicly traded bank 
holding companies that were among the 200 largest top-tier 
BHCs in terms of book value of assets for each year between 
1986 and 1996. We collected additional data on these firms for 
1997-99; however, the number of firms dropped to thirty-two 
during those years due to merger and acquisition activity. For 
1997, 1998, and 1999, our sample consists of thirty-four, thirty-
three, and thirty-two institutions, respectively. The require-
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collect data on internal governance characteristics from proxy 
statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
The governance data are measured on the date of the proxy at 
the beginning of the corresponding fiscal year. We adjust our 
data to account for the fact that proxies disclose some 
governance characteristics for the previous fiscal year and 
others for the following fiscal year. We collected balance-sheet 
data from fourth-quarter Consolidated Financial Statements 
for Bank Holding Companies (Form FR Y-9C) from the 
Federal Reserve Board and stock price and return data from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices.
The requirement that the firms be among the 200 largest 
each year during 1986-96 means that our findings could be 
different for smaller bank holding companies. However, the 
requirement was imposed to study the role of governance in 
firms where the potential impact of poor governance could be 
serious. The assets of our sample of BHCs constitute a large 
fraction of total industry assets (32.3 percent of all top-tier 
BHC assets in 1990). Reflecting the increasing consolidation in 
the industry, this number rose to 50.75 percent in 1998. Thus, 
poor governance of the sample firms could have potentially 
serious effects on the banking industry.
Our requirement of a minimum of ten years of data on each 
firm may raise concerns about sample selection (or survivor-
ship) bias; surviving firms in the sample have systematically 
different, perhaps superior, governance than do delisted 
BHCs.17 However, since the qualitative nature of our 
comparisons between BHCs and manufacturing firms holds 
for the entire sample as well as for individual years, we do not 
believe that survivorship bias affects our results. In addition, as 
we discuss, other studies that have examined subsets of the 
variables that we analyze find similar results using other sample 
selection procedures (see, for example, Houston and James 
[1995] and Booth, Cornett, and Tehranian [2002]).18
Table 1 presents the distribution of means of selected 
financial variables for our sample BHCs. Perhaps the most 
important trend evident is the increasing firm size, measured 
by the book value of assets, which reflects the heightened 
consolidation in the industry (see also Stiroh [2000]). An 
average firm in our sample had $18.7 billion (median: 
$9.1 billion) of assets at the end 1986, rising to $91.5 billion 
(median: $43.4 billion) in 1999. Bank primary capital has also 
increased, from 7 percent in 1986 to 8.5 percent in 1999.19 
The increase is consistent with revisions to capital adequacy 
standards and the general upward trend in capital 
accumulation by banks in the 1990s (see Estrella [2002] and 
Flannery and Rangan [2002]). Tobin’s Q and return on assets, 
as proxies for performance, have also exhibited an upward 
trend since 1990, consistent with the industry trend (see 
Stiroh [2000]).20
4. Findings from the Corporate 
Governance Variables
Table 2 provides summary statistics for selected variables that 
describe the governance structures of our sample BHCs; 
Table 3 compares the variables’ means and medians with those 
in comparison samples of manufacturing firms. We emphasize 
that our analysis and comparison are not regression-based; 
rather, our purpose is to compile a series of descriptive statistics 
in one place. We choose manufacturing firms for comparison 
because their governance structures have been analyzed more 
extensively by researchers than those of firms in other 
industries; data availability was also a determining factor.
4.1 Board Size and Composition
As Table 2 shows, an average of eighteen directors make up 
each BHC board, although there is a wide distribution of board 
size in the sample (a minimum of eight directors and a 
maximum of thirty-six). Over the sample period, it is apparent 
that banking firm boards are becoming smaller. An average 
board in 1999 had 17 directors (median: 18), down from 20.3 
in 1986 (median: 20). The trend is consistent with the finding 
of Adams and Mehran (2002), who examine BHC board size 
over the 1959-99 period. As Table 3 indicates, an average S&P 
manufacturing firm had six fewer directors than an average 
BHC did over the sample period. Booth, Cornett, and 
Tehranian (2002) also provide evidence that banks have larger 
boards, using a sample of the 100 largest BHCs and the 100 
largest manufacturing firms in 1999. 
There are at least three plausible reasons why BHCs have 
larger boards. First, studies have shown that board size is 
positively correlated with firm size (see, for example, Hermalin 
and Weisbach [2003], Yermack [1996], and Baker and 
Gompers [2000]), and BHCs are larger than manufacturing 
firms in terms of asset size.21 Second, BHC boards may be 
larger because of their complex organizational structure. BHCs 
may own or control many subsidiary banks, each of which has 
its own board. Coordination among these different boards may 
affect the structure of the BHC board, for instance, because of 
the need to include directors from the subsidiary boards on the 
BHC board (see Adams and Mehran [2002] for a discussion of 
this argument). Third, as we have observed, the nature of 
acquisitions (hostile versus friendly) could play a role in 
maintaining the large size of an average BHC board. An active 
level of consolidation among our sample firms—and in the 
banking industry during our sample period—could account 
for the larger boards of our BHCs. Consolidation in the 128 Is Corporate Governance Different
Table 1
Mean and Median of Selected Financial Variables 
Panel A: Yearly Comparisons
Variable 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Book value of assets 
  (billions of dollars)
Mean 18.7 19.9 22.3 25.0 26.5 29.0 31.3 37.9 41.6 47.0 51.6 59.3 82.9 91.5
Median 9.1 9.3 10.9 12.2 13.8 15.0 20.8 21.5 21.8 31.9 32.5 35.2 39.1 43.4
Primary capital ratio
  (percent)
Mean 7.0 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.7 8.2 8.7 8.9 8.6 8.5 8.6 8.6 8.3 8.5
Median 6.9 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.8 8.2 8.7 8.8 8.3 8.3 8.7 8.4 8.2 8.6
Return on assets (percent)
Mean 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Median 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3
Return on equity (percent)
Mean 14.3 6.4 14.5 9.4 8.7 6.6 11.0 13.1 15.0 14.7 15.2 15.5 14.8 16.1
Median 14.8 11.9 15.5 13.6 12.9 12.0 14.1 14.2 15.2 15.2 15.8 15.7 15.5 17.7
Q-ratio
Mean 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1
Median 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1
Stock return (percent)
Mean 17.0 -10.8 23.3 19.2 -21.3 75.3 43.1 4.6 -3.5 55.6 33.2 62.2 7.6 -17.5
Median 17.9 -8.6 19.9 19.0 -12.9 84.8 32.5 1.8 -2.9 54.4 32.7 64.8 5.1 -19.8
Monthly volatility of 
  stock return (percent)
Mean 8.5 9.9 6.3 6.2 10.6 9.6 7.2 6.6 5.9 5.9 5.4 7.1 10.5 8.8
Median 8.4 9.8 6.5 5.5 10.3 8.0 5.7 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.3 7.0 10.1 8.3
Panel B: 1986-99 Comparisons
Sample Descriptive Statistics Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Book value of assets (billions of dollars) 40.9 22.1 3.0 632.6
Primary capital ratio (percent) 8.2 8.0 3.0 14.9
Return on assets (percent) 0.9 1.0 -2.8 2.3
Return on equity (percent) 12.5 14.7 -82.3 33.8
Q-ratio 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.5
Stock return (percent) 21.0 16.7 -67.7 139.8
Monthly volatility of stock return
  (percent) 7.7 7.1 1.2 22.3
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for selected financial variables, both on a yearly basis and for the entire sample, for our sample of bank holding 
companies (BHCs) from 1986 to 1999. All variables are from the fourth-quarter “Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies” (Federal 
Reserve FR Y-9C Report), except for monthly stock returns, which are from the Center for Research in Security Prices. Sample data are not available for all 
firms for all years because of acquisitions of sample banks in 1997-99. For 1986-96, our sample consists of thirty-five BHCs; for 1997, 1998, and 1999, it 
consists of thirty-four, thirty-three, and thirty-two institutions, respectively. We calculate a measure of bank capital—its primary capital ratio—which we 
define as the sum of the book value of common stock, perpetual preferred stock, surplus, undivided profits, capital reserves, mandatory convertible debt, 
loan and lease loss reserves, and minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries minus intangible assets. Return on assets is calculated as the ratio of net 
income to book value of assets. Our measure of Q is the ratio of the firm’s market value to its book value of assets. The firm’s market value is calculated as 
book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity. Volatility of stock returns is measured as the standard deviation of the monthly 
stock returns on the stock price for the given year.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2003 129
Table 2
Mean and Median of Selected Corporate Governance Variables
Panel A: Yearly Comparisons
Variable 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Board size
Mean 20.3 19.9 19.7 19.1 18.2 17.4 17.5 17.2 16.9 16.7 16.9 17.0 17.3 17.0
Median 20 19 19 19 18 16 18 17 15 17 17 16 17.5 18
Outside directors (percent)
Mean 69.9 71.6 71.2 68.9 70.2 68.5 67.5 66.8 66.7 66.2 67.4 65.7 67.2 75.1
Median 71.4 72.2 71.4 71.4 72.7 72.1 71.4 69.2 66.7 69.9 69.9 69.9 73.3 75.0
Outside and “gray”
  directors (percent)
Mean 80.1 80.2 80.1 78.7 80.1 79.9 80.4 80.0 80.2 80.0 80.0 79.2 79.6 81.6
Median 81.3 81.8 81.8 80.0 81.5 80.0 82.1 80.0 80.9 78.6 78.8 77.7 79.6 83.3
Number of board meetings
Mean 8.5 8.6 8.5 8.5 8.6 9.3 9.0 9.3 8.7 8.4 8.1 8.0 7.2 7.5
M e d i a n 887988 . 5 9 1 0888877
Number of board 
  committees
Mean 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.9 4.8 5.0 5.0
M e d i a n 44444445555555
Ratio of value of granted 
  options to salary plus 
  bonuses
M e a n ——————0 . 2 9 0 . 4 1 0 . 7 8 1 . 0 1 1 . 0 9 0 . 8 7 1 . 7 6 1 . 6 5
M e d i a n ——————0 . 2 0 0 . 3 6 0 . 5 8 0 . 4 3 0 . 5 2 0 . 5 1 0 . 9 7 1 . 2 2
Shares owned by CEO
  (percent)
Mean 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.5 3.1
Median 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
Panel B: 1986-99 Comparisons
Sample Descriptive Statistics Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Board size 18.0 18.0 8.0 36.0
Outside directors (percent) 68.7 71.4 10.0 95.2
Outside and “gray” directors (percent) 80.0 81.0 44.4 95.2
Number of board meetings 8.5 8.0 2.0 24.0
Number of board committees 4.4 4.0 1.0 9.0
Ratio of value of granted options to
  salary plus bonuses 0.99 0.50 0.0 19.85
Shares owned by CEO (percent) 2.3 0.4 0.0 49.4
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for selected corporate governance variables, both on a yearly basis and for the entire sample, for our sample of 
bank holding companies (BHCs) from 1986 to 1999. Sample data are not available for all firms for all years because of incomplete data, due primarily to 
missing proxy statements, and because of acquisitions of sample banks in 1997-99. For 1986-96, our sample consists of thirty-five BHCs; for 1997, 1998, and 
1999, it consists of thirty-four, thirty-three, and thirty-two institutions, respectively. Data on the governance characteristics are from proxy statements filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We consider a director to be an insider if he works for the firm and an outsider if he is not a top 
executive, a retired executive, a former executive, a relative of the CEO or chairperson, or an outside lawyer employed by the firm at any point in our sample. 
All other directors are “gray.” Compensation data are from ExecuComp 2000, and therefore are available only from 1992 to 1999. Ownership data are from 
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Table 3
Comparisons of Descriptive Statistics on Selected Corporate Governance and Financial Variables
for Bank Holding Companies and Manufacturing Firms
 

























Monthly stock return volatility (percent)h
Mean 7.78 8.85***
Median 7.09 7.92***
Notes: The table presents statistical comparisons of selected corporate governance and financial variables for our sample of bank holding companies (BHCs) 
and for unregulated, nonfinancial manufacturing firms from 1986 to 1999. Because no data set on manufacturing firms contains all governance variables of 
interest over the 1986-99 period, the data source used to construct summary statistics for manufacturing firms varies by the variable under consideration 
and may also vary by year. For each variable, the BHC statistic is computed for the same sample period as the statistic for manufacturing firms. 
a Manufacturing firm data are from Yermack (1995) for 1986-91 and from Spencer Stuart S&P 100 for 1995-96 and S&P 500 for 1997-99. 
There are 2,394 firm-years.
b Manufacturing firm data for 1992-99 are from ExecuComp and are for the top fifty S&P 500 firms based on total assets. 
There are 400 manufacturing firm-years.
c Manufacturing firm data for 1986-91 are from Yermack (1995); 1992-99 data are from ExecuComp. There are 6,613 manufacturing firm-years.
d Manafacturing firm data are for the top fifty S&P 500 manufacturing firms in terms of market value and are from Yermack (1995) for 1986-91 
and from ExecuComp for 1992-99.
e Manufacturing firm data for 1995 and 1996 are from Spencer Stuart S&P 100; 1997-99 data are from Spencer Stuart S&P 500. There are 724 firm-years.
f Manufacturing firm data for 1995 and 1996 are from Spencer Stuart S&P 100; 1997-98 data are from Spencer Stuart S&P 500. There are 510 firm-years.
g Manufacturing firm data for 1986-91 are from Yermack (1995); 1992-99 data are from Compustat for a sample of manufacturing firms in the S&P 500. 
There are 4,017 firm-years.
h The variable is calculated as the standard deviation of monthly returns for a year, then averaged over 1986-99. Manufacturing firm data include 
manufacturers from Yermack (1995) over the 1986-91 period. Data for 1992-99 are from Compustat for the S&P 500. There are 1,474 manufacturing 
firm-years.
 
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
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banking industry alone, however, cannot explain why bank 
boards are larger. Adams and Mehran (2002) show that BHC 
board size appears to be large relative to manufacturing board 
size even before the post-1986 wave of consolidation. In 
addition, it is difficult to reconcile the increase in consolidation 
with the downward trend in BHC board size over time.
According to Table 2, the mean percentage of outside 
directors in the sample is 68.7 percent (median: 71.4 percent).22 
Table 3 shows that the percentage of outside directors in BHCs 
is significantly larger than in S&P manufacturing firms, where 
the mean percentage is 60.6 percent (median: 66.7 percent).23 
The mean percentage of outside and “gray” directors in 1999, 
81.6 percent (median: 83.3 percent), is almost the same as what 
is reported in Booth, Cornett, and Tehranian (2002) for the 100 
largest BHCs. The authors also find that the mean and median 
percentages of outside directors are higher for commercial 
banks relative to the top 100 manufacturing firms in 1999. 
It should be noted that certain regulations at the bank level, 
as opposed to the holding company level, could constrain 
board structure with regard to size and composition. For 
example, the board of a national bank (regulated and 
supervised by the OCC) must consist of at least five, but no 
more than twenty-five, members (the comptroller can exempt 
the national bank from the twenty-five-member limit). Each 
state member bank, supervised by the Federal Reserve, is 
required to be managed by a board. Board size is also regulated 
separately. For example, New York State banks are required to 
have a board of no less than seven directors and no more than 
thirty (with capital stock, surplus, and divided profits in excess 
of $50 million). Different states may also have requirements on 
board composition at the bank level; for example, New York 
State’s regulation requires two-thirds of the directors of each 
state bank to be outsiders.
Since such regulatory restrictions generally apply only to 
board structure at the bank level and not the holding company 
level, which is the focus of this study, the regulatory environment 
alone does not explain BHC board size and composition. 
However, regulation may have an indirect effect on the structure 
of BHC boards to the extent that it is influenced by the structure 
of the boards of the BHC’s lead bank and other subsidiary banks 
(see, for example, Adams and Mehran [2002]). 
4.2 Board Activity
Table 2 provides information on board activity and committee 
structure. An average BHC in the sample meets 8.5 times per year 
(median: 8). However, there has been a downward trend in this 
number. As shown in Table 3, BHC boards meet slightly more 
frequently than boards of manufacturing firms (although only 
the median differences are significant at the 10 percent level).
The number of annual board meetings for a bank, rather 
than a holding company, is regulated at the state level. For 
example, during our sample period, New York State member 
banks were required to have a minimum of ten meetings per 
year (two conference call meetings were allowed). State 
regulations on the number of meetings may influence the 
bank’s choice of directors, since potential directors might have 
a better chance of being nominated if they live within 
proximity to the bank.24
BHCs have on average 4.4 board committees (median: 4). 
This figure has increased by one over the sample period. In 
addition, the average number of directors per committee has 
decreased over time, from 5.8 in 1986 to 3.9 in 1999, likely due 
to the decline in BHC board size, which is not shown in the 
tables. Moreover, the average BHC had more committees than 
did the average manufacturing firm (Table 3), and the 
difference was statistically significant.
4.3 CEO Compensation
The mean and median ratios of the value of new option grants 
to salary plus bonuses from 1992 to 1999 are presented in 
Table 2. Note that the sum of salary, bonuses, and stock 
options is more than 90 percent of an average CEO’s total 
compensation (Murphy [1999]). Note also that although the 
mean and median for salary and bonuses are rising (not 
reported here), growth in the value of options granted to CEOs 
is significantly higher than that of salary and bonuses. By 1999, 
the mean ratio of the value of stock options to salary plus 
bonuses is 1.65 (median: 1.22).
The increased use of stock options in executive compen-
sation packages in banking follows the pattern of other 
industries, even though the growth and level of stock option use 
are significantly lower than in manufacturing firms. Table 3 
compares the ratio of the value of granted stock options to salary 
plus bonuses for the fifty largest S&P 500 manufacturing firms in 
terms of assets with our sample of BHCs over 1992-99. The value 
of options granted to CEOs of manufacturing firms on average is 
60 percent larger than the sum of base salary and bonuses; 
however, this does not hold for the chief executives of BHCs.
One potential explanation for the lower reliance on stock 
options in the banking industry is found in Smith and Watts 
(1992), who show that low-growth industries rely less on stock-
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Watts suggest that boards can observe, monitor, and evaluate 
the actions of CEOs of firms and industries with low-growth 
opportunities much easier than they can in firms or industries 
with high-growth opportunities. Thus, boards in such 
industries should rely more on fixed rather than on stock-based 
compensation. 
Based on several proxies for growth opportunities advanced 
in the literature—such as Tobin’s Q, market-to-book ratio, 
research-and-development-to-sales ratio, and volatility—
BHCs can be considered to have the characteristics of low-
growth firms. The average Tobin’s Q in our BHC sample is 
almost 1 (Table 2), which is far less than the Q-ratios reported 
in unregulated business environments.25 It is also well 
documented that banking industry volatility, measured by the 
standard deviation of daily or monthly returns, is significantly 
smaller than volatility in samples of manufacturing firms (see 
Campbell et al. [2001], and Table 3). In addition to being a 
characteristic of low-growth firms, low volatility may make it 
easier for banking firm boards to monitor CEO actions.26
Finally, given the low stock-return volatility in the banking 
industry, all else equal, the value of stock options in banks will be 
lower. To compensate the CEO for a given dollar value of 
granted options, the bank has to give a larger number of options 
relative to those given by an average manufacturing firm. This 
can have an adverse effect on the bank’s share price because it 
produces a larger dilution effect.27 Thus, it may be more difficult 
for a bank than for a manufacturing firm to award a given 
amount of option compensation to its top executives. 
4.4 CEO Ownership
As reported in Table 2, an average CEO in our sample owns 
2.3 percent of the firm (median: 0.4 percent). The share is less 
than the CEO ownership in manufacturing firms (Table 3). 
This result is consistent with the findings of Houston and 
James (1995), as well as those of Booth, Cornett, and Tehranian 
(2002), who document that the mean percentage of stock 
holdings by officers and inside directors of manufacturing 
firms is 8.97 percent, compared with 5.77 percent in BHCs. 
CEO ownership across BHCs and manufacturing firms may 
differ for several reasons. One can argue that the smaller flow 
of options to bank holding company CEOs leads to smaller 
ownership (we do not report the number of options granted to 
CEOs).28 Also, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) contend that in 
noisier environments (for example, proxied by the standard 
deviation of stock returns), monitoring costs are very high. In 
this case, the authors expect managerial ownership to be more 
concentrated in order to reduce agency problems. Because our 
sample BHCs experience relatively low volatility, monitoring 
costs may be lower for them than for manufacturing firms, 
which may make large ownership concentration unnecessary. 
Furthermore, Demsetz and Lehn argue that regulators may 
substitute for some of the monitoring functions of ownership.
There may also be a mechanical issue influencing the 
percentage of ownership. Since BHCs are significantly more 
leveraged and have more assets than manufacturing firms, 
ownership levels across the two types of firms may not be 
comparable.29 An important insight of Modigliani and Miller 
(1963) in a world with corporate taxes is that the cash-flow 
claims of an ownership stake in an all-equity firm differ from 
those associated with the same percentage of equity ownership 
of an identical firm with a positive debt level. In addition, there 
is a documented inverse relationship between size, typically 
measured by the book value of assets, and the percentage of 
equity held by the CEO (see, for example, Demsetz and Lehn 
[1985]).
To avoid this mechanical issue, it is also useful to examine 
differences in the market value of CEO holdings across BHCs 
and manufacturing firms. Accordingly, we measure the market 
value of the direct equity stake of an average CEO in the top 
fifty S&P 500 manufacturing firms and compare it with the 
CEO equity stake market value of our sample BHCs (Table 3). 
On average, each BHC chief executive has nearly $28 million 
invested in his firm, as opposed to $133.8 million for each CEO 
of a manufacturing firm, although these results are skewed (the 
median BHC chief executive has $11.9 million of investment, 
compared with $9.6 million for the manufacturing firm CEO). 
Similarly, Houston and James (1995) report that nonbank 
CEOs in their sample have on average nearly eight times more 
invested in their firms than banking firm CEOs. It should be 
noted that their sample covers nonbanking firms, unlike ours, 
which includes only manufacturing firms. Therefore, CEOs of 
manufacturing firms on average have more invested in the 
equity of their firms than do chief executives of BHCs. 
Moreover, we note that CEO pay in BHCs is not tied to 
performance as much as it is in manufacturing firms. These 
observations suggest that CEOs in these two industries have 
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4.5 Block Ownership
To compile our statistics on block ownership, we rely on the 
CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings Database of 
Thomson Financial. Institutional shareholding is our proxy for 
monitoring by blockholders. However, the corporate 
governance literature also emphasizes the importance of the 
identity of blockholders and individuals, as opposed to just the 
size of institutional holdings (see Holderness [2003]).30 
Accordingly, we first examined the identity of the top three 
institutions holding a share of each BHC for each year in our 
sample.31 We found that bank-affiliated institutions held a 
substantial amount of the shares of BHCs. For example, 
Barclays Bank PLC held 3.4 percent and Amsouth 
Bancorpation held 2.2 percent of the shares of Amsouth 
Bancorporation in 1999. Further examination of the data and 
discussions with bank-affiliated institutions revealed that such 
holdings are often the result of asset management activities, 
trust activities, or custodial activities.32 Bank-affiliated 
institutions are unlikely to monitor the BHC over the course of 
these activities; therefore, to construct our summary statistics 
on institutional holders, we deleted all bank-affiliated 
institutions from the list of institutional holders of our BHCs 
in all years. We also examined the identity of institutions 
holding shares of manufacturing firms; however, we found 
very few cases of blockholders that were affiliated with 
manufacturing firms (for example, because the firm set up a 
foundation).33
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on nonaffiliated 
institutional share holdings of our sample BHCs as well as of 
the S&P 500 manufacturing firms from 1986 to 1999. Total 
institutional holdings were on average between 37 percent and 
47 percent of the shares of a BHC each year, with a sample 
mean of 42.4 percent (median: 42.7 percent)—far less than the 
holdings in manufacturing firms. As the table shows, there has 
been little change in mean holdings in BHCs over time. For 
example, institutions held on average 40.7 percent of each BHC 
in 1986 and 40.1 percent in 1996.34 However, the number of 
institutions holding shares of each BHC has increased from 
nearly 108 in 1986 to 230 in 1996 and to 363 in 1999 (or 
236 percent), suggesting that the size of an individual 
institutional holding has decreased over time. Panel A of 
Table 4 also indicates that the number of institutions that 
invest in manufacturing firms was larger in every year of the 
sample. 
Panel B of Table 4 presents the statistics for the entire 
sample. On average, 535 institutions held shares of each 
manufacturing firm in the S&P 500, versus 204 for BHCs. 
Institutions held 54.6 percent of each manufacturing firm, 
compared with 42.4 percent of each BHC; the difference was 
statistically significant. Because the literature emphasizes that 
top holders may have greater incentives to monitor the firm, we 
also calculated the top holding for each group. On average, we 
found that top holders held 5.2 percent and 5.4 percent of each 
BHC and manufacturing firm, respectively; the difference, 
however, was not statistically significant.
5. Conclusions and Directions
for Future Research
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that board structure, 
ownership structure, and compensation structure are 
determined by one another as well as by a range of variables, 
such as risk, real and financial assets, cash flow, firm size, and 
regulation. They suggest that these variables also influence a 
firm’s conduct and performance. Although other studies have 
examined these potentially complex governance relationships 
in unregulated industries, few have examined them in the 
context of a regulated environment. This article extends the 
current literature by comparing aspects of the corporate 
governance of regulated institutions—bank holding 
companies—with aspects of the governance of unregulated 
manufacturing firms.
We find that BHC boards are larger than those of 
manufacturing firms, although they have been declining in size 
over time.35 BHC boards also have slightly more outside 
directors. These differences are very likely the outcome of BHC 
size and organizational structure, the regulatory framework, 
and constraints on the ability of BHCs to engage in hostile 
acquisitions. Thus, normative statements about either board 
size or board composition that do not take into account 
banking industry differences are potentially misleading. For 
example, Adams and Mehran (2002) show that in contrast to 
findings for nonfinancial firms, larger BHC boards on average 
are not value-decreasing, and that board composition is 
unrelated to BHC performance. The fact that board 
composition is not positively correlated with performance 
seems surprising, since bank supervisors share examination 
results with the boards of directors (and may visit the boards of 
banks that perform poorly and are low in capital). However, 
this lack of correlation is consistent with the theory that as a 
result of regulatory requirements, directors do not emphasize 
value maximization over the safety and soundness of the 
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Table 4
Comparisons of Descriptive Statistics on Unaffiliated Institutional Holdings Data for Bank Holding 
Companies and S&P 500 Manufacturing Firms, 1986-99
Panel A: Yearly Comparisons 
Variable 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
BHC S&P BHC S&P BHC S&P BHC S&P BHC S&P BHC S&P BHC S&P
Mean number of
  institutions 107.9 375.6*** 107.6 410.0*** 129.1 417.4*** 142.1 439.5*** 127.8 451.3*** 157.6 477.7*** 184.6 498.5***
Mean holding
  (percent) 40.7 53.0*** 37.2 53.4*** 38.3 52.5*** 40.8 52.0*** 38.5 53.6*** 43.2 53.4*** 47.5 54.5**
Median holding
  (percent) 39.8 53.4*** 31.6 53.2*** 35.2 53.6*** 37.8 53.0*** 38.7 54.6*** 48.3 54.8** 52.4 56.0*
Mean holding of
  top holder 
  (percent) 5.5 5.0 4.9 5.6 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.6 5.3 5.8 5.0 6.0 5.1
Variable 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
BHC S&P BHC S&P BHC S&P BHC S&P BHC S&P BHC S&P BHC S&P
Mean number of
  institutions 188.5 502.3*** 186.1 511.0*** 216.3 559.1*** 230.2 586.7*** 274.9 646.5*** 318.4 736.1*** 363.2 787.9***
Mean holding
  (percent) 44.9 55.3*** 42.1 54.2*** 42.6 55.0*** 40.1 55.4*** 43.9 56.4*** 45.0 57.4*** 45.5 56.7***
Median holding
  (percent) 48.3 56.4*** 40.5 55.2*** 37.9 55.9*** 38.4 57.6*** 42.9 57.7*** 44.3 56.5*** 45.0 58.5***
Mean holding of
  top holder 
  (percent) 5.5 5.2 5.3 5.5*** 5.1 5.6*** 5.1 5.7*** 4.7 5.8*** 4.9 5.8*** 4.4 5.8**
                                                    Panel B: 1986-99 Comparisons 
Variable BHC S&P
Mean number of institutions 204.2 535.4***
Mean holding (percent) 42.4 54.6***
Median holding (percent) 42.7 55.7***
Mean holding of top holder (percent) 5.2 5.4***
Notes: The table presents summary statistics and statistical comparisons of selected unaffiliated institutional holdings data for our sample of bank holding 
companies (BHCs) and for all unregulated, nonfinancial S&P 500 firms from 1986 to 1999. All institutional holdings data are from the CDA/Spectrum 
Institutional (13f) Holdings Database of Thomson Financial. To construct data on unaffiliated institutional holders of BHCs, we examined the list of 
institutional holder names for each year and deleted bank-affiliated holders. We also deleted affiliated institutions (such as company foundations) in the 
S&P 500 sample from 1997 to 1999. Because we found only nineteen cases of affiliated institutions during this period, we did not extend this procedure to the 
S&P 500 data for all years. BHC sample data are not available for all firms for all years because of acquisitions of sample banks in 1997-99. For 1986-96, our 
sample consists of thirty-five BHCs; for 1997, 1998, and 1999, it consists of thirty-four, thirty-three, and thirty-two institutions, respectively.    
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2003 135
relates to performance, it is important to also understand what 
BHCs expect from their outside directors, what the regulatory 
mandates are, and how outside directors balance these 
different expectations.
We also find that BHC boards have more committees and 
meet slightly more frequently than manufacturing firm boards. 
It is difficult to speculate on the costs and benefits to BHCs of 
having more committees.36 However, one can argue that 
regulations on the number of meetings may influence the 
bank’s choice of directors; thus, regulations can potentially 
affect the quality of directors willing to serve on these boards.37
In addition, BHC boards are found to rely less on long-term 
incentive-based compensation, such as stock options, in their 
CEO compensation packages; CEO ownership, in terms of 
percentage and market value, is also found to be smaller in 
BHCs. Since observed compensation packages and ownership 
are the outcome of a contracting process that takes into 
account industry structure as well as regulation, we should not 
expect CEO compensation structures to become similar to 
those of manufacturing firms in the near future.
Finally, fewer institutions hold shares of our sample BHCs 
relative to manufacturing firms, and institutions hold a smaller 
percentage of a BHC’s equity. The question is whether 
institutions that do hold BHC stock are active in the 
governance of BHCs. We are unable to answer this question 
now since there have been very few documented cases of 
institutions taking a reactive or proactive role in the 
governance of banking firms. It is possible that institutional 
investors prefer to resolve banking firms’ governance issues 
privately (Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach 1998), so as to avoid 
public announcements, which may also be destabilizing. Or, 
institutions may expect regulators to resolve the governance 
problems of BHCs. This remains an important area for future 
research.
The systematic differences found between the governance of 
banking and manufacturing firms highlight the point that 
governance structures are in fact industry-specific. We suggest 
that these differences are due to the differences in the 
investment opportunities of BHCs and manufacturing firms as 
well as to the presence of regulation. Our findings imply that 
governance reforms, in order to be effective, could take 
industry differences into account.
More generally, our results raise the bigger question of 
whether the governance structure of banking firms is optimal, 
in the sense that it maximizes shareholder value subject to the 
constraints imposed on these firms. To answer this question, 
future research will have to examine the effect of governance 
structures in banking on measures of firm performance. One 
step in this direction has already been taken by Adams and 
Mehran (2002), whose findings suggest at a minimum that 
differences between the board structures of banking firms and 
manufacturing firms may not be a cause for concern.Endnotes
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1. In all likelihood, similar results will also hold for firms in the thrift 
industry, except during the conversion period, when insiders gain a 
significant equity stake in the conversion process (see Cole and 
Mehran [1998]).
2. The literature also identifies a conflict between stockholders, 
including managers, and bondholders (see, for example, Jensen and 
Meckling [1976] and Galai and Masulis [1976]). The conflict has been 
the source of much analysis on the effect of managers’ risk-taking on 
depositors and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
insurance fund.
3. The literature on the governance of a general firm is reviewed 
elsewhere in this volume.
4. Boards, according to law, have two fiduciary duties to the company: 
the duty of care and the duty of loyalty (see Macey and O’Hara [2003] 
for a discussion and interpretation of these duties).
5. It is important to realize that the objectives of regulators and those 
of banking firms may not coincide, which could impact the 
governance, and in turn the conduct, of the firm. In theory, there is a 
conflict between the objectives of regulators—safety and 
soundness—and those of shareholders—value maximization. When a 
conflict exists between value maximization and the need to support 
prudent operations, regulators expect boards to balance these concerns 
effectively, by ensuring that bank performance as well as safety and 
soundness are taken into account. Little is known as to how these 
conflicts affect the ability of top management and boards of directors 
to serve these potentially divergent interests. Similarly, higher 
standards of accountability on the boards of regulated firms versus 
those of unregulated firms could hinder the ability of regulated firms 
to attract talented directors, which could adversely affect BHC 
performance—but it is unclear if this is the case. For example, a higher 
standard of accountability for bank directors and, arguably, well-
defined regulatory expectations have led the government to sue 
directors to recover some of the losses in bank failures, particularly 
during periods of poor economic performance and large numbers of 
failures. Fearing litigation, many directors have stepped down, and 
numerous banks have had difficulty attracting directors (see Quint 
[1992]).
6. Examples of the regulatory expectations for bank boards are: 1) to 
establish bank strategies (Basel Committee); 2) to approve short-term 
business plans (OCC Director’s Book); 3) to review and approve 
proposed departures from long- and short-term business plans before 
they take place (OCC’s Director’s Book); 4) to review and approve 
budgets prepared by management (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 
New Director’s Primer); 5) to establish policies that govern day-to-day 
operations (Federal Reserve Board Commercial Bank Examination 
Manual); 6) to adopt real estate appraisal and evaluation policies 
(Federal Reserve Board Commercial Bank Examination Manual); 
7) to maintain an adequate allowance for loan loss reserve and review 
it on a quarterly basis (Interagency Policy Statement on Loan and 
Lease Losses); 8) to approve bank risk management policies annually 
(Federal Reserve Board Trading Activities Manual); 9) to establish 
limits on payment system net debit caps (Federal Reserve Board 
Payment System Risk Policy); 10) to approve the bank’s Bank Secrecy 
Act compliance program (Federal Reserve Regulation H); and 11) to 
review monthly exposure reports (121 Report and New York State 
banking law).
7. For example, bank supervision that ensures that the bank complies 
with regulatory requirements could play a general monitoring role. 
John, Mehran, and Qian (2003) support this argument by showing 
that weak BHC examination ratings are correlated with high pay-
performance sensitivity of CEO compensation.
8. An additional consequence of supervision playing a role in the 
governance of banking firms will likely be that capital markets will 
demand less disclosure from banking firms and markets will invest less 
in information production useful for investors in the banking 
industry.
9. John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) argue that regulatory oversight 
has to take such incentive distortions into account when establishing 
procedures; regulation that accounts for the incentives of top 
management will be more effective than capital regulation in 
ameliorating risk-shifting incentives. The authors suggest that pay-
performance sensitivity of top-management compensation in banks 
may be a useful input in pricing FDIC insurance premiums and 
designing bank regulation. Similarly, Cole and Mehran (1998) suggest 
that because insider ownership improves firm performance, and thus 
reduces the risk of default, regulators can encourage ownership as a 
“complement to, or substitute for, capital requirements, which 
generates their own inefficiencies” (p. 294).
10. For example, Hothchkiss (1995) reports that only 41 percent of 
CEOs of distressed firms were replaced in the month of filing and 
55 percent were replaced by the time reorganization was approved.Endnotes (Continued)
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11. See Skeel (1999) for a similar discussion. Mehran and Winton 
(2001) further argue that liquidation of distressed firms in the banking 
industry and seniority of depositors’ claims to management 
compensation contracts would cause CEOs of banking firms, all else 
equal, to demand higher compensation when they are nominated to 
these positions.
12. Few papers have focused on the effect of deregulation on the pay-
performance sensitivity of CEO compensation (some examples are 
Hubbard and Palia [1995] and Crawford, Ezzel, and Miles [1995]). 
Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) provide evidence that relaxation of 
branching restrictions has lowered banks’ loan losses and operating 
costs.
13.One of the consequences of industry homogeneity is that monitors 
rely more on objective measures of performance, such as stock or 
accounting returns, than on subjective measures, such as marketing 
strategy and the rate of product diffusion. See Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999) and Kedia (forthcoming) for further discussion and evidence 
on the effect of product market competition on management 
compensation. 
14. However, John, Mehran, and Qian (2003) show that the CEOs of 
BHCs with higher subordinated debt as a fraction of their assets have 
higher pay-performance sensitivity. They argue that subordinated 
debtholders, unlike other creditors, have incentives to monitor the 
bank, particularly with respect to its risk choices.
15. Becher and Campbell (2002) document 4 cash acquisitions in a 
sample of 146 mergers in the 1990-99 period. Given the banking 
industry’s financial health and profitability in the 1990s and the size of 
the targets to bidders in the sample (about 5.5 percent), cash offerings 
are not a puzzle.
16. For example, the proposal to adopt risk-based deposit insurance 
for commercial banks in 1993 initially received significant opposition 
from the banking community. The view was that analysts might be 
able to back out the value of a bank’s CAMEL rating by determining 
capital ratios and FDIC insurance premiums from its income 
statement. Thus, investors potentially would become more aware of a 
bank’s risk. Opponents argued that riskier banks in need of equity 
capital may have difficulty issuing equity (see Cornett, Mehran, and 
Tehranian [1998a] for more information). 
17. However, Boyd and Runkle (1993) argue that regulators rarely 
liquidate large distressed banks or BHCs. In the event of reorgani-
zation via acquisition by another bank, the failing bank often, but 
not always, loses its identity. In some cases, the management of the 
distressed firm is removed (changes in governance) but its identity 
continues. The authors argue that this minimizes potential 
survivorship bias in most samples of banking firms.
18. To address additional concerns about survivorship bias, we also 
examined the stock price performance of our sample firms relative to 
several benchmarks of publicly traded BHCs from 1986 to 1999. In 
each case, we excluded the sample firms from the benchmark. Over 
the 1986-99 period, the monthly raw stock returns of our BHC sample 
very closely matched the returns of benchmark portfolios, both on an 
equal- and value-weighted return basis, and the t-tests for the 
difference between portfolio returns on the sample and on the 
benchmark were not statistically significant. Because our sample firms 
do not outperform or underperform several benchmark bank 
portfolios in terms of stock returns, we argue that the observed 
characteristics of our sample BHCs’ governance structures are not 
systematically different from those of other bank holding companies. 
19.  Bank primary capital is measured as the sum of the book value of 
common stock, preferred stock, surplus, undivided profits, capital 
reserves, mandatory convertible debt, loan and lease loss reserves, and 
minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries minus intangible assets.
20. Tobin’s Q is measured as (book value of assets plus market value 
of equity minus book value of equity)/book value of assets. Return on 
assets is measured as net income/book value of assets.
21. For example, mean assets from a 1992-99 sample of 336 
unregulated firms in the 1998 Fortune 500 were $11.08 billion 
(Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira 2002), compared with $40.9 billion 
in our 1986-99 sample.
22. We define an outside director as a board member who is not a top 
executive, a retired executive, a former executive, a relative of the CEO 
or the chairperson of the board, or an outside corporate lawyer 
employed by the firm at any point during our sample period.  Although 
this definition of an outside director has been used extensively in the 
financial economics literature (see, for example, Weisbach [1988]), it 
is narrower than the banking regulatory definition in many states. For 
instance, the New York State Banking Department considers an 
outsider of a state bank’s board to include a current officer or employee 
of the bank holding company and any affiliate of the bank. Directors 
who are neither insiders—that is, executives of the BHC—nor outsiders 
according to our definition are considered to be “gray.”138 Is Corporate Governance Different 
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23. On the one hand, the high proportion of outsiders in our sample 
is surprising because our classification of who is an independent 
outsider is stricter than it is in other studies: a director is not an 
outsider if he was an officer or had any business relationship with the 
BHC in any of the fourteen years of the sample. In contrast, most 
cross-sectional studies can only classify directors based on current 
employee status or business relationships. On the other hand, because 
these are banking firms, the proportion of outsiders may overstate the 
board’s true independence, as lending relationships between the 
directors and/or the directors’ employers and the BHC or its 
subsidiaries exist but are not disclosed in proxies. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to obtain data on these lending relationships, so we cannot 
adjust our classification of directors accordingly.
24. The majority of directors of national banks must be selected from 
a certain proximity to the bank’s head office (unless the residency 
requirement is waived by the comptroller).
25. It is not unusual for low-growth industries to experience waves of 
consolidation. Other industries that have experienced this phenom-
enon, besides banking, are the oil industry in the 1970s and the defense 
industry in the late 1980s.
26. We emphasize that the board may have less difficulty monitoring 
the actions of BHC chief executives than those of manufacturing firm 
CEOs. Our argument is not about monitoring by the capital markets. 
We contend that bank boards, like other boards, have private 
information that is unavailable to the markets. In addition, bank 
boards have access to regulators’ examination reports. Whether the 
capital markets can do a better job of monitoring BHCs compared 
with firms in other industries has attracted researchers’ attention in 
the past few years. For example, Morgan (2002), using ratings by bond 
analysts, finds much greater dispersion in issues of BHCs relative to 
those of other firms. He interprets this finding in support of 
“opaqueness” of bank assets. Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran 
(2002), using micro-structure data and dispersion of stock analysts, 
conclude that these analysts have no more or less ability to monitor 
BHCs versus nonfinancial firms in the S&P 500. 
We argue that, although both sets of results are highly useful, a 
definitive conclusion on the “opaqueness” of BHC assets versus assets 
of other firms is premature. First, both studies are silent on the lessons 
of capital market studies on corporate decisions or events. For 
example, it has been shown that market reaction to equity issues by 
manufacturing firms is around -3.0 percent. Cornett, Mehran, and 
Tehranian (1998b) document a much smaller reaction, nearly 
-1.7 percent, for BHCs issuing equity. They also document a reaction 
not statistically different from zero for BHCs issuing equity that have 
low capital relative to minimum regulatory capital. The simplest 
interpretation of this result is that the announcement of an equity 
issue is less newsworthy to the market or that the market anticipated 
the event. This is particularly true in cases of forced equity issue. 
Moreover, it has been shown that stock market reaction to share 
repurchase announcements by BHCs is not significant (see, for 
example, Billingsley et al. [1989]), in contrast to a 3.5 percent positive 
reaction by unregulated firms (see, for example, Rau and Vermaelen 
[2002]). Second, we document that BHC stock-return volatility is 
lower than that of manufacturing firms. One can decompose volatility 
into two components: asset volatility and leverage volatility. It is 
evident that banks are highly leveraged and a significant part of their 
volatility is due to leverage. That being said, the volatility of their assets 
should be even much lower relative, for example, to the asset volatility 
of manufacturing firms. Lower asset volatility makes it easier for the 
market, as well as the board, to evaluate the BHC. Given the 
significantly smaller announcement returns on corporate events in the 
banking industry as well as the lower volatility—and given the limited 
research on “opaqueness”—we are unable to make definitive 
statements about whether BHCs are more “opaque” or less “opaque” 
than firms in other industries. This remains an important area for 
future research.
27. See Core, Guay, and Kothari (1999) for more discussion.
28. However, the effect of options on ownership may not be large; 
Ofek and Yermack (2000) show that when top executives exercise their 
options to acquire stock, they sell the shares they already own.
29. For example, the largest BHC in our sample in 1999 had a book 
value of assets that was 2.2 times greater than that of the largest 
manufacturing firm. However, the same BHC’s market value fell short 
of the manufacturing firm’s market value in 1999.
30. We do not report holdings by individual blockholders, as BHC 
proxy statements indicate that these individuals were generally 
affiliated with the management of the BHCs in the sample.
31. We found an upward trend in the number of BHCs held by 
institutions over time: in 1986, only nineteen (or 54.3 percent) BHCs 
had institutional holdings; in 1999, the figure had increased to twenty-
nine (or 87.5 percent).
32. For example, Barclays Bank PLC’s holdings of Amsouth 
Bancorporation in 1999 were retained in a custodial capacity and 
Amsouth’s holdings of its own shares were retained by a subsidiary 
bank as a pension manager.Endnotes (Continued)
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33. We examined the list of institutional holders of our sample of 
manufacturing firms from 1997 to 1999, but found only nineteen 
affiliated institutions to delete; therefore, we did not extend this 
procedure to the previous years. Note that since our deletion 
procedure is based on institutional names, we are likely to eliminate 
fewer institutions than necessary both from the manufacturing firms 
and from the BHCs. 
34. These numbers increased slightly in the following years. However, 
the rise may be due to some BHCs dropping out of our sample in 
1997-99.
35. Wu (2000) documents that the size of manufacturing firm boards 
is declining over time; thus, this does not mean that the gap between 
BHC board size and manufacturing board size is narrowing.
36.  In general, committees are shaped in part by factors external to the 
board, such as regulatory bodies, interest groups, labor unions, and 
shareholders (see Hayes, Mehran, and Schaefer [2000] for a discussion 
of committee structures).
37. Future research could also consider the effect of directorship by 
insiders and outsiders on a director’s ability to perform his 
responsibilities. Moreover, the potential negative effects of interlocks 
in the banking industry—that is, situations in which the CEO or 
chairman of a BHC is on the board of another company, while that 
other company’s CEO or chairman is on the board of the BHC—
warrant attention. Adams and Mehran (2003) discuss these and other 
governance issues not addressed in this article.References
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